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DEPOSITIONS OF PARTIES ON ORAL INTERROGA-
TORIES, WITHIN THE STATE OF COLORADO
By PHILIP S. VAN CISE of the Denver Bar.T HE right to take depositions of parties in advance of
trial has long been conferred by the Code, but in prac-
tice has been very little used. Now, however, lawyers
in numerous states are utilizing the deposition for everything
from gathering facts for use in drawing the complaint, to tak-
ing testimony for actual introduction at the trial. And so
widespread is the practice becoming that it is very properly
called "Discovery Before Trial" in a new book by George
Ragland, published under the auspices of the Legal Research
Institute of the University of Michigan.
On July 14th of this year, due to the approval by the
Governor of Senate Bills 170 and 171, Colorado will have
one of the most liberal deposition statutes in the United
States. And if the members of the Bar make proper use of
the discovery machinery now available to them, an appreci-
able proportion of our court trials should be done away with,
because the definite ascertainment of the truth in advance of
trial will afford a basis for settlement or require an early dis-
missal of the suit.
Whether or not a party could be called for cross-exami-
nation upon a deposition under Sec. 6570 of the Compiled
Laws of 1921 was one of the most disputed questions at the
Bar, until the Supreme Court, in Taylor vs. Briggs, 18 Pac.
(2d) 452, held that no such right was extended except at
the trial itself. However the legislature has now broadened
the statute to read "A party * * * may be examined upon
the trial thereof, or upon deposition, or both, as if under
cross-examination." And Sec. 376 of the Code has been en-
larged to properly define what officers of a party corporation
may be so examined, viz., "a director, officer, superintendent
or managing agent of any corporation."
The right to take depositions in an action at law is
purely statutory (18 Corpus Juris 606), while in equity the
right had been exercised from an early day (18 Corpus Juris
607). Hence, it is necessary carefully to study the statutes
in order to see just what rights are conferred thereunder, bear-
ing in mind, however, that the Code procedure is to be liberal-
ly construed.
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Colorado Code, Sec. 479.
People vs. District Court, 66 Colo. 424-426.
Ellinger vs. Equitable Life, 125 Wis. 643.
The deposition provisions of the Colorado Code are
modeled after those of California (Ragland, p. 280) and
many of the other Western States have followed their Pacific
neighbor. Hence such citations are of particular value to us.
I.
The Code confers the absolute right to take depositions
at any time after the service of the summons or the appear-
ance of the defendant.
There are two distinct chapters of the Code which must
be examined in connection with the law of discovery before
trial. Chapter XXXIV deals with depositions, Chapter
XXXV with inspection of documents. Under the first chap-
ter, for depositions taken in the state, no order of court is re-
quired. Under the second chapter, no inspection can be ob-
tained without an order of court. This definite separation
into chapters is also found in the codes of many other states,
hence their decisions are vital here.
In Chapter XXXIV the Code expressly gives the right
to take the deposition of the witnesses specified therein, at any
time after the service of the summons or the appearance of
the defendant, and this privilege cannot be denied by the
Court. In fact mandamus will lie if the Court forbids the
taking of a deposition.
Kibele vs. Court, 121 Pac. 412 (Cal.).
The deposition can be taken either by following the
Code or by stipulation. If the Code procedure is invoked all
that is required is that the adverse party be served with a
notice of the time and place where the deposition will be taken
and with a copy of the affidavit of the other party, his agent
or attorney. And all that has to be stated in this affidavit is
that the party served is a party to the action, either plaintiff
or defendant.
If the other side will waive this procedure, and as a rule
counsel will do so, unless they wish delay, a stipulation has
all the force and effect of the affidavit and notice and dis-
penses with them.
People vs. District Court, 66 Colo. 424.
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Except where the time of notice is shortened, there is no
provision in the Code for an order of Court for the examina-
tion of a witness; there is no provision for an application for
an order for such examination; there is no provision for an
examination by the Court of the affidavit or other showing
on which such discretion is to be exercised. The only statu-
tory duties imposed upon the judge up to the appearance of
the parties at the deposition, and a dispute thereat, are to
shorten the time of taking the deposition, if asked so to do,
or to preside at the examination, if noticed before him.
Of course, under the general powers of the court, the
judge, upon application, may change the time or place of
holding the examination, or substitute a notary for the judge,
or judge for the notary. However, subject to those limita-
tions, counsel have full power to fix the time and place of the
hearing (within the county where the party resides) and to
designate the judge, justice or notary before whom it is to be
taken.
II.
The deposition statute supplants the former equitable
bill of discovery.
"The distinction between actions at law and suits in equity
* * * are abolished."
Colo. Code, sec. 1.
"Statutory proceedings for the examination of a party before
trial have generally been held to operate as a substitute for the chancery
bill of discovery."
18 Corpus Juris, 1085.
"Bills of discovery are not authorized in those states in which
codes of civil procedure have been adopted, blending law and equity
into one system and providing for the discovery of evidence by in-
terrogatories."
9 Ruling Case Law 167.
Olmsted vs. Edson (Neb. 1904), 98 N. W. 415-417.
Fox vs. Clifton Co., infra.
III.
No showing is required as to the reason or grounds for
taking a deposition.
This is excellently illustrated in a well reasoned case in
South Carolina. The action was a personal injury case, and
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after answer to the complaint the defendant obtained an order
to take the deposition of plaintiff. This the ccurt later re-
voked, on the ground that, before a party to an action is en-
titled to examine the adversaryf, he must show a good and
valid reason upon which the court can exercise its discretion,
and that as the defendant had made no other showing than
that the plaintiff was a party to the action, which in his opin-
ion was not a sufficient showing, the revocation of the order
must follow.
The Supreme Court promptly reversed the case, holding
the showing was sufficient, and that no discretion rested in the
court. It held:
"The defendant takes the position that a party to an action is
entitled, as a matter of legal right, to examine his adversary under * * *
the Code, without assigning any other reason than the mere fact that
the person sought to be examined is a party to the action. This pre-
sents the issue of law to be determined; the defendant claims it is an
absolute right, the circuit judge holds that it was a matter for the
exercise of his discretion upon a proper showing by the defendant.
"No illumination of this question can be found in the rules which
regulate the equitable remedy of discovery, for it is held * * * that the
right to examine an adversary party, conferred by the Code, is a new
remedy and operated to destroy the pre-existing remedies in equity;
and * * * that it operated to 'take the place of the former equitable
remedy by a bill in discovery.' We are therefore effectually shut into a
construction of the provisions of the Code. Nor are we aided at all by
the cases which involve the right of a party, * * * to secure an inspec-
tion of books, papers and documents in the possession of the adversary
party * * * for the reasons that the provisions of Chapter 5, * * *
relative to inspection of books, etc., is essentially different in several par-
ticulars from Chapter 6, * * * relating to the examination of parties.
The subjects are so different as to suggest assigning them to different
chapters, chapter 5 being entitled 'Admission or inspection of writings'
and chapter 6, 'Examination of parties.' Chapter 5 authorizes an in-
spection of writings only upon three conditions: (1) Due notice to the
adverse party of the application for the order; (2) the issuance of the
order by a court or a judge or a justice thereof; (3) the exercise of the
judge's discretion in the matter. * * *
"Now turning to Chapter 6, relating to the examination of par-
ties, we do not find any provisian for an order by anyone for the exami-
nation of the adverse party; consequently no provision foran application
for such order, and no provision for notice of such application, naturally
finding no provision for an order by a court or a judge or justice there-
of, we find nothing indicating the exercise of a discretion by him and of
course no implied requirement of an affidavit or other showing upon
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which such discretion is to be exercised. The only duties or powers
imposed upon a judge in connection with this matter are to preside at
the examination, to change the time of notice if good cause be shown,
to compel the attendance of the witnesses, and to file the examination,
it is assumed, with the clerk of court
"It has been suggested that the expressions * * * 'may be
examined,' 'may be compelled,' denote the existence of a discretion
lodged in someone controlling the matter. There would be much force
in the suggestion if some officer had been designated to order the exami-
nation. As the provisions stand, no order is required and no officer is
designated to issue it; the examination is to be had 'at the instance
of the adverse party,' and to him is the expression 'may be' referrable."
Fox vs. Clifton Co., 114 S. E. (So. Car.) 700-701.
Ellinger vs. Equitable Life, 125 Wis. 643.
Olmsted vs. Edson, 98 N. W. 415 (Neb.).
Eaton vs. Farmer, 46 N. H. 200.
"The very object of the old bill of discovery was to procure evi-
dence against the opposite party to be used on the trial of an action.
* * * The statute undoubtedly goes further than the bill of discovery,
and not only allows an examination of the party as to those matters
which the party seeking the examination cannot prove by other wit-
nesses or testimony, but it allows an examination as to all the material
issues in the action."
Meier vs. Paulus, 70 Wis. 165-170; 35 N. W. 301-3.
IV.
Purposes for which depositions may be taken.
Depositions may be taken either to obtain testimony or
to frame pleadings.
(a) To frame the complaint.
Fisher vs. Smith, 243 N. W. 4-5.
Smith vs. Wooding, 94 S. E. 404..
Lockwood vs. Merchant's Dispatch, 254 N. Y. S. 573.
St. John vs. Putnam, 220 N. Y. S. 146.
in many states a skeleton complaint is filed, depositions taken, and
the complaint amended. Discovery, Ragland, p. 60.
(b) To frame the answer.
Note L. R. A. 1918 C, 598.
State vs. District Court (Mont. 1925), 236 Pac. 553-4. (And
the Montana Statute is taken from California.)
(c) After demurrer sustained to the complaint.
Kibele vs. Court, 121 Pac. 412-413 (Cal.).
Rossbach vs. Superior Court, 185 Pac. 879 (Cal.).
(Note: Colorado deposition statute comes from California.)
Ex parte Munford, 57 Mo. 603.
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(d) Before answer.
State vs. District Court, 236 Pac. 553-4 (Mont. 1925).
(Note: Montana statute comes from California.)
(e) Irrespective of the state of the pleadings.
Ex parte Alexander, 163 Mo. 615; 147 S. W. 521.
Bennett vs. Strodtman, 42 S. W. (2d) 43.
(f) After judgment.
Gas Co. vs. Court, 155 Cal. 30; 17 Ann. Cases 933.
V.
Steps to be taken to secure deposition in Colorado before
filing the complaint.
The first question to be determined is: Can a deposition
be taken in this state to aid in framing the complaint? We
believe it can, as the code specifically provides (as before
stated), without qualification-that the deposition of a party
can be taken "at any time after the service of the summons or
the appearance of the defendant" (Sec. 376). The main
drawback is that of time because Section 34 of the Code re-
quires that the complaint must be filed within ten days after
the summons is issued.
The procedure would be to file a praecipe for summons,
setting out the form of action and relief demanded, and have
the summons issued- by the clerk and served upon defendant.
Section 377 requires five days' notice of the taking of the
deposition. If this period is not deemed too long the notice,
affidavit and subpoena (issued by the clerk or notary, unless a
subpoena duces tecum is involved, when a court order should
be obtained) should be served subsequent to the summons.
But if five days is considered too long a time, and it
usually will be if the deposition is desired to obtain facts to
aid in drafting the complaint, an application must be made
to the court to shorten the time. In no event should this ap-
plication be made before summons has been served and re-
turned into court.
Then we must determine what steps to take to shorten
this five day interval.
The Code provides (sec. 377) that the five days' notice
must be given "unless for a cause shown, a judge, by order,
prescribes a shorter time. When a shorter time is prescribed,
a copy of the order shall be served with the notice."
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It would seem that the intent of the Code was an ex
parte application, otherwise there is no possible reason for
serving defendant with a copy of the order. But the Court of
Appeals has expressly held to the contrary in Troth vs. Crow,
1 A. 455, and decided that unless the order was obtained on
notice the deposition should be quashed. In that case, how-
ever, the deposition was taken after the appearance of the
defendant, and the case should not be decisive where no ap-
pearance has been entered, as Section 414 of the Code provides
"after appearance a defendant * * * shall be entitled to no-
tice of all subsequent proceedings, of which notice is required
to be given. But when a defendant has not appeared, service
of notice or papers need not be made upon him."
However, if it is imperative that no time be lost, the safer
remedy would seem to be to serve the summons, and after-
wards, as above outlined, the other papers, fixing the five day
time, and accompany them with a motion to shorten the time
of taking, and with a twenty-four hour notice thereof. Then
call up the motion, get the order, and serve new notice, affi-
davit, subpoena and copy of the order shortening the time.
When the deposition is taken before the complaint is
served, more objections may arise as to the materiality of the
questions than would be apt to be made after the complaint
is filed. However, the rule is well illustrated in a Missouri case
where the court held:
"The taking of the depositions has no necessary reference to the
state of the pleadings at the time of the taking * * * consequently
the subjects of proper inquiry are those that pertain generally to the
subject matter of the action, and not merely those that are encompassed
within the limits of the pleading at the time."
Bennett vs. Strodtman (Mo.), 42 S. W. (2d) 43-45.
VI.
Questions which can be asked.
Before answer, any question is material under the issues
made by the complaint (or summons) and any possible de-
fense thereto.
Kibele vs. Court, 121 Pac. 412 (Cal.).
Gas Co. vs. Court, 155 Cal. 30.
Rossbach vs. Court, 185 Pac. 879.
Ex parte Munford, 57 Mo. 603.
262
DICTA
Olmsted vs. Edson, 98 N. W. 415 (Neb.).
Eaton vs. Farmers, 46 N. H. 200.
Ex parte Alexander, 163 Mo. App. 615; 147 S. W. 521.
Bennett vs. Strodtman, 42 S. W. (2d) 43.
"In none of the jurisdictions in which depositios-1 procedure is
used for purposes of discovery before trial in the scope of the examina-
tion restricted to narrower limits than would obtain upon examination
at the trial. As a matter of practice the scope is even broader than
at the trial. * * * The epithet 'fishing excursion for the adverse
party's evidence' has been employed [but has not been successful]. * * *
Taft said 'There is no objection that I know why each party should
not know the other's case.'
Ragland, p. 120.
In contradistinction it may be of interest to know what
questions the witness cannot be compelled to answer.
1. Those which might tend to incriminate. This
privilege can only be claimed by the witness himself, and not
by his counsel. (Of course, counsel should very carefully con-
sider the bad effect of any such claim in a civil case before hav-
ing his client make any such excuse.)
Lothrop vs. Roberts, 16 Colo. 250.
Barr vs. People, 30 Colo. 522.
O'Chiato vs. People, 73 Colo. 192-194-195.
2. The names of witnesses, the manner in which a
party expects to establish his case, or the confidenital reports
or communications of his agent in relation to the controversy.
Armstrong vs. Portland Ry. Co., 52 Ore. 437; 97 Pac. 715.
VII.
In Tort Cases.
Apart from the question, still unsettled in this state, as
to the right of a defendant, against whom a body judgment is
sought, to refuse to answer interrogatories on the ground of
incrimination, and with the exception of the decisions in New
York, there seems to be no difference in the right to take
depositions in actions ex contractu and actions ex delicto.
The Appellate Division of the first department of the
Supreme Court of New York refuses to allow depositions to
be taken in tort cases, the other departments disagree and
allow them. And the New York Court of Appeals has re-
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fused to declaje any uniform rule of practice, holding that it
is entirely within the discretion of the lower courts.
Middleton vs. Boardman, 206 N. Y. S. 725.
Schonbaus vs. Weiner" 246 N. Y. S. 73.
VIII.
Procedure at Deposition.
If before the court, interrogatories and objections are the
same as at the trial.
If before a notary, the oath should be taken and all
proper questions answered. If improper questions are asked,
counsel should state his objection in the record, and then pur-
sue one of two remedies, either to have the question answered,
or to refuse to allow an answer, and to require an order of
court thereon. The first procedure saves the time of court
and counsel, and to proceed otherwise may needlessly prolong
the taking of the deposition. In any event, unless the party
walks out or refuses to answer, all questions should be asked
and the deposition finished so that the objections raised will
not be presented to the court piecemeal.
No one but the Judge of the Court in which the case is
pending has any power to rule on objections. A notary in
Colorado is simply an instrumentality of the court who has
power to subpoena the witness and to administer the oath.
From then on he must sit idly by (or act as reporter) until
the deposition is completed. In some states, as Missouri and
Nebraska, he has the right to order questions answered and
to commit for contempt. But in Colorado in this respect he
is in effect a wooden Indian.
In case the witness walks out or refuses to answer ques-
tions, or to sign the deposition, the notary should certify the
proceedings to the court. Counsel should prepare a petition
for an order on the adverse party to answer the interroga-
tories, or to complete the deposition, and attach the notary's
report thereto. The court will then pass upon the questions
and determine whether they should be answered or not. And






After the deposition has been reduced to writing the
witness should read it over, sign it and then after certification,
it should be sealed and filed with the clerk of the court (sec.
378).
After the deposition is filed counsel should protect his
rights and have his objections ruled on promptly. Section
388 of the Code provides:
"All objections, exceptions and motions in respect to depositions,
shall be made and disposed of before the trial; provided, That objections
to the competency, relevancy or materiality of the testimony therein,
may be reserved and ruled on during the trial. Any party having
depositions on file, may, by order of the court or judge, require the
opposite party to file any objections, exception or motion he may have
in respect thereto within a reasonable time, or be thereafter precluded
from making the same."
And a failure to make such objection has been held to be
deemed a waiver.
Cowan vs. Cowan, 16 Colo. 335-338.
The deposition can be read by either side at any stage of
the action, at which time it "shall be deemed evidence of the
party reading it" (Code, sec. 379).
Whether or not one is bound by the testimony of his
adversary, until the cross-examination amendment goes into
effect, is almost a moot question. However, it has been held
that one is not.
Wigmore on Evidence, 912.
Ragland, page 52.
Conclusion.
The writer has taken depositions in a large variety of ac-
tions, and has found them to be one of the most valuable
weapons of the lawyer. In cases which savor of blackmail a
prompt demand for the deposition of the plaintiff usually
stops the case at the threshold. In malpractice cases the plain-
tiff is advised of the technical defense of the physician and
learns how to meet it, while the defendant doctor can turn
the tables and commit the plaintiff at the inception of the
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case to what his facts really are. And the same is true in all
personal injury cases, because when the actual injuries of
plaintiff are ascertained, settlements are greatly simplified. In
cases against fraudulent stock salesmen an immediate applica-
tion for deposition, plus a subpoena duces tecum for their
books, is conducive to rapid settlement.
As lawyers we seek the truth. Oftimes we find, to our
sorrow, that our own client has withheld vital facts. If so,
we prefer to have those facts produced at the deposition rather
than to meet a non-suit after a battle in court. And if the
other party has a questionable case, the sooner we drag it out
into the light of day, so that we can reduce it to writing and
then check it with the facts, the better for litigants and the
Bar.
England and several of our states provide special pro-
cedure by which either party may call upon the adversary to
admit, for the purposes of the trial, the existence of facts. Our
deposition statutes give us that, and more. And with the right
of cross-examination, now fully conferred, we look for a
widespread adoption of depositions as fact finders, time
savers and docket reducers.
Recently graduated law students may in this depression
era be forced to the status pictured in the following advertise-
ment copied from the Prescott Miner (Arizona) of Au-
gust, 1879:
STEPHEN G. MORAN
(Jack of All Trades)
Attorney at Law, will practice in all courts, draws deeds
and all papers; veterinary surgeon and General contractor.
Cleans vaults, whitewashes fences, digs wells, saws and chops
wood. Translates French, German and Spanish papers.
Works by the day, hour or job. Office at residence on Goose
Flat. Give me a call.
Simon Quiat, Samuel S. Ginsberg and Nathan H. Creamer have
associated themselves as co-partners under the firm name of Quiat, Gins-
berg 4 Creamer, 850 Equitable Building, Tabor 1366.
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